Articles Posted in Staten Island

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An old woman, 95 years of age, is a patient at a certain Staten island hospital. On 9 June 1998, she became comatose, cyanotic and unresponsive after she became disconnected from her ventilator machine. An employee of the hospital heard the old woman’s room alarm sound but the alarm at the nurses’ station failed to sound. Hence, it could not be determined as to how long the old woman remained disconnected from the ventilator. Respirator assistance was then provided to the old woman by the medical staff of the hospital. Thereafter, she was immediately transferred back to the cardiac care unit, which is where she had been prior to the ventilator incident, and there she received intensive therapeutic care and massive blood transfusions. From 10 June 1998 through 11 June 1998, the consulting neurologist indicated in his progress notes that the old woman had a guarded prognosis and was not receptive to outside stimuli. From 12 June 1998 through 17 June 1998, the progress notes indicated that the old woman was improving. The old woman’s neurologist then noted that she was at baseline, neurologically stable. In other words, the old woman’s neurological condition returned to the state that it had been prior to the ventilator disconnection. Thereafter, the hospital took several remedial measures to prevent any future incidents of this type. The hospital’s Code 15 committee reviewed the old woman’s case to decide whether or not it warranted Code 15 treatment, which consists of reporting to the Agency for Health Care Administration or AHCA within fifteen days of the incident, but later voted against such Code 15 treatment, believing that since the old woman recovered to her neurological baseline, no brain damage or brain injury had occurred. Instead of filing the incident as a Code 15, the hospital reported the occurrence as an adverse incident in its Annual Report of Incidents.

Consequently, the AHCA filed an administrative complaint against the hospital and contends that the hospital violated the law by reason of their failure to report a hypoxic event that caused brain damage to a patient as a Code 15 occurrence.

Sometime in December 2000, a formal hearing was held. After that, the administrative Law Judge or ALJ concluded that the old woman did in fact suffer from a brain damage, a transient or temporary brain damage, and the hospital should have reported the incident as a Code 15; and recommended that AHCA had justification to levy a $5,000.00 administrative fine against the hospital.

The hospital now appeals the aforesaid order.

The first issue is whether or not the hospital was required to report the incident to the AHCA.
Under the law, the hospital, as a licensed hospital facility, is required to report to AHCA within fifteen days of occurrence, any adverse or untoward incident that results in a brain or spinal injury to a patient. The standard of review of an agency decision based upon an issue of law is whether the agency erroneously interpreted the law and, if so, whether a correct interpretation compels a particular action. An agency’s interpretation of the statute it is charged with enforcing is entitled to great deference. However, a court need not defer to an agency’s construction or application of a statute if special agency expertise is not required, or if the agency’s interpretation conflicts with the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute. If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the statute should be given its plain meaning. When necessary, the plain and ordinary meaning of words in a statute can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary.

Here, the subject statute provides for the term “brain damage”, which exists under the list of every potential personal injury enumerated therein, separate and apart from any condition that results in a limitation of neurological, physical, or sensory function which continues after discharge from the facility. Thus, it is irrelevant under the injury or adverse or untoward incident, whether any brain damage in fact continues after discharge from the facility. Upon a reading of the subject statute, the words clearly mandate that whenever a brain or spinal injury to a patient result, it needs to be reported as a Code 15 occurrence. There is no word permanent before the word brain injury. In fact, the only term in the list of injuries enumerated, that the Legislature described as permanent, is that of disfigurement. No such other term modifies brain damage. Thus, since the Legislature did not modify the term brain damage with any word such as permanent or temporary, this intentional legislative omission cannot be lightly disregarded. The rule is, courts are not at liberty to add words to statutes that were not placed there by the Legislature. Thus, the Queens court finds that the plain meaning of the term is clear and unambiguous.

Moreover, under the Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, the word “damage” is defined as a loss due to injury; injury or harm to a person, property or reputation; while under the Black’s Law Dictionary, it is defined as a loss or injury to person or property. Obviously, this dictionary definition does not confine the term to only permanent injury. Thus, based upon the plain meaning of the subject statute, the court finds that brain damage can result even if a patient, such as the old woman, returns to a neurological baseline.

The second issue is whether or not the requirement of reporting any incident of brain damage to AHCA is indeed a logical interpretation of the applicable statute.

As a rule, once an enumerated incident occurs, a licensed facility must report to the agency within fifteen days. If a facility does not have to report an incident caused by a ventilator disconnection until the facility learns whether or not the incident is of a permanent nature, then in many cases it would be impossible for the facility to report to the agency within fifteen days.

Here, while the old woman did begin to return to a neurological baseline within three to four days, it is also quite possible that the old woman could have remained comatose for months before returning to baseline. If the court would rule that he hospital was not required to report the incident because the old woman later recovered, this outcome is not reasonable and would render the fifteen-day reporting requirement period dependent upon the length of the personal injury instead of its severity. Thus, the court finds that the hospital is certainly required to make the report. This interpretation of the subject statute renders a more logical outcome.

Lastly, the third issue is whether or not AHCA’s construction and interpretation of the term “brain damage” were vague and unconstitutional as applied to appellant, but AHCA argues that appellant waived this constitutional challenge by failing to raise this issue timely.
Under the rules, constitutional challenges can be raised for the first time on appeal. Administrative agencies lack the power to consider or determine constitutional issues. Courts have ruled that the administrative process cannot resolve a constitutional attack on a statute, rule or regulation; and that a party is not required to argue the facial constitutionality of a statute before an administrative agency because the agency lacks the power to declare a statute unconstitutional.

Here, since the order appealed from was decided by an administrative agency, the hospital can challenge the constitutionality of AHCA’s action for the first time in appeal. Nonetheless, the subject statute is clear and unambiguous; and, the rule is, if the record demonstrates that a party engaged in some conduct that is clearly proscribed by the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute, then that party cannot successfully challenge it for vagueness. The AHCA’s construction and interpretation of the statute are not vague and were not unconstitutionally applied to the hospital. Thus, by not reporting the ventilator incident as a Code 15 occurrence, the hospital undoubtedly violated the statute.
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When an accident occurs that involves a personal injury, it is important that the injured person seeks help immediately. The laws of New York are truncated when it comes to personal injury. They have set limits on many of the areas that involve compensable injury. If a person does not file their claim within a certain period of time, they will be barred from recovering damages at all. By the same token, the person must prove that their injury is serious under the guidelines of the law. The law defines the guidelines that describe an injury as either serious or substantial. It also provides guidelines that establish what permanent loss of use relates to. For a person to recover damages based on these statutes, they must be able to establish that their injury falls into these categories.

A substantial injury is one that demands a change in the person’s lifestyle. A person who has suffered from a substantial or serious injury will have to stop doing many of the activities that they used to be able to do. If a person is able to continue performing their jobs, or handling their home lives in much the same manner that they were conducting themselves prior to the injury, then they have not sustained a serious injury in accordance with the laws of the state of New York. Generally, when a person makes a claim for personal injury as the result of an accident, they must bring forth expert testimony that will support their claim. A claim of serious injury that is not supported by medical evidence will fail. In fact, a claim of serious injury that is supported only by medical expert opinion and not supported by concrete medical tests will likely fail as well. When a person files a claim of this sort, it is critical that they are sure that they can present this type of medical evidence in court.

Sometimes, even having several doctors willing to testify in your behalf can be challenged. In one case from New York, a limousine driver was involved in an accident that resulted in his sustaining multiple injuries that he claimed were serious under the statute. In fact, some of his claims involved the fact that he was deprived the use of some body parts. He also claimed a serious spine injury and brain injury. He had no less than four medical experts testify on his behalf that he was unable to work or perform daily functions that he had once enjoyed based upon the injury that he had sustained.

The Staten Island defendants in the suit, claimed that he had failed to present a sufficient case to show that he had sustained a serious injury by way of the legal definition of the injury. They brought forth their own doctors who testified that the man’s injuries were treatable. That would mean that the injuries were not considered permanent under the law and would prohibit the man from succeeding with his claim. They filed a motion in Queens with the court to enable them to obtain a summary judgment that would state that the man’s claims were not proved.

A summary judgment is a court action that provides a determination of liability to one party over another without going to trial. The action of a summary judgment is severe and most courts refrain from granting summary judgment in all but the most solid cases. Summary judgment precludes a trial and can limit the recourse that an individual has. In this case, the court denied the insurance company’s motion for summary judgment based on the evidence that the injured man provided. He had definitive test results from his doctors.
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Defendant American Real Estate Holdings, LP (American), an out-of-possession owner, leased the building where plaintiff’s accident occurred to defendant Levitz Furniture Corporation of Queens (Levitz). The building consisted of a furniture showroom, an office and warehouse space. Prior to plaintiff’s accident, Levitz had sold large furniture shelving rack unit, as well as other similar units, to defendant and third-party plaintiff International Storage Systems, Inc. (International). International was in the business of buying, dismantling, selling and then reinstalling large furniture rack systems. Pursuant to an oral agreement, which is reflected in various invoices and purchase orders, International then hired plaintiff’s employer, third-party and second-third party defendant Heatley Installations (Heatley), to disassemble the furniture rack system and transport it to another location.

A Lawyer said that, plaintiff testified that, just prior to his accident he was in the process of disassembling the free-standing furniture rack system while standing on a particle-board deck located on the third level of the rack. As plaintiff was removing beams from the level above, and dropping them onto the deck, the deck broke, causing him to fall and sustain brain injuries.

At the time of his accident, the Staten Island plaintiff was not utilizing an available order selector provided for use in retrieving furniture at higher levels. An order selector is a piece of equipment resembling a forklift, which has a platform upon which a worker can stand. In addition, although he was wearing the safety belt provided to him by his employer, plaintiff had not properly tethered to the order selector, despite having been directed to do so less than one hour before his accident.

Plaintiff then filed an action to recover damages against the defendants, for personal injuries he sustained.

Defendants American and Levitz move, for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff complaint as against them and granting indemnity as against defendant and third-party plaintiff International and third-party defendant and second-third party defendant Heatley.
Plaintiff cross-moves, for an order (1) granting summary judgment in his favor on his Labor Law § 240 (1) claim as against defendants American, Levitz and International; (2) granting a Special Trial Preference in his favor; and (3) directing that plaintiff be entitled to a lower burden of proof due to his cognitive injuries.

Defendant and third-party plaintiff International moves, pursuant to CPLR 3212, for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s complaint, as well as all cross claims against it.

Third-party defendant and second-third party defendant Heatley also moves, for summary judgment dismissing the third-party and second third-party actions against it in accordance with Section 23 of the Massachusetts Workers’ Compensation Law which bars all third-party actions against the employer in common law; or, in the alternative, in the absence of a finding of “grave injury,” in accordance with Section 11 of the New York Workers’ Compensation Law. Heatley also moves for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff’s actions were the sole proximate cause of his injuries.

The issue in this case is whether plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment to recover damages from the defendants, for personal injuries he sustained.

The Court in resolving the motion said that, the proponent of a summary judgment motion must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues of fact from the case. The burden then shifts to the motion’s opponent to present evidentiary facts in admissible form sufficient to raise a genuine, triable issue of fact.

Labor Law § 240 (1), also known as the Scaffold Law, provides, in relevant part:
All contractors and owners and their agents in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting … shall furnish or erect, or cause to be furnished or erected for the performance of such labor, scaffolding, hoists … and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person so employed.

Labor Law § 240 (1) was designed to prevent those types of accidents in which the scaffold or other protective device proved inadequate to shield the injured worker from harm directly flowing from the application of the force of gravity to an object or person. To prevail on a section 240 (1) claim, the plaintiff must show that the statute was violated and that this violation was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.

Pursuant to a stipulation of discontinuance, plaintiff discontinued his claims as against defendant Levitz. As such, Levitz’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims as against it is denied as moot.

Initially, it should be noted that the furniture rack from which plaintiff fell was a “structure” within the meaning of the Labor Law, as a structure is viewed as `any production or piece of work artificially built up or composed of parts joined together in some definite manner’. In addition, since the furniture rack is to be considered a “structure” for Labor Law purposes, and because plaintiff was directed to dismantle it, plaintiff was engaged in demolition work covered by the Labor Law. Further, testimony in the record indicates that the furniture rack was being used by plaintiff, as well as other workers, as the functional equivalent of a scaffold at the time of plaintiff’s accident.

American moves to dismiss plaintiff’s claims against it on the ground that it was an out-of-possession owner who lacked notice or knowledge of the work being performed at the site.
The Court said that, it is well settled that, to recover under Labor Law §§ 200, 240 and 241 as a member of the special class for whose protection these provisions were adopted, a plaintiff must establish two criteria: (1) that he was permitted or suffered to perform work on a structure and, (2) that he was hired by the owner, the general contractor or an agent of the owner or general contractor
In order for the Labor Law to be applied to an out-of-possession owner, there must be a connection between the defendant and the worker, whether by a lease agreement or grant of an easement, or other property interest.

In the case at bar, a review of the record reveals no proof that defendant American contracted for the work at issue or that it had any notice whatsoever that plaintiff was on its premises until after the accident. In fact, under a triple net lease between American and Levitz, Levitz was responsible for all structural and non-structural repairs, maintenance and costs. American did not employ anyone to supervise any work on the property. As no nexus has been shown to have existed between American and plaintiff in this case, American cannot be charged with the duty of providing the safe working conditions contemplated by Labor Law §§ 240 (1) and 241 (6). Thus, American is entitled to summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs section 240 (1) and 241 (6) claims as against it.

However, as evidence in the record indicates that defendant International not only owned the furniture racks at issue at the time of plaintiffs accident, but that it also contracted with third-party defendant Heatley for their disassembly and removal, International is to be considered an owner of the structure within the meaning of the Labor Law.

Defendant International asserts that plaintiffs Labor Law § 240 (1) claim must be dismissed as against it, as plaintiff’s own negligent actions in not wearing his safety harness, despite being told by his employer that he had to be tied off in order to work, as the sole proximate cause of his head injuries. Where plaintiffs own actions are the sole proximate cause of the accident, there can be no liability under Labor Law § 240 (1).

Here, the Court said that, even if plaintiff was negligent for his failure to properly tether his safety harness, utilize the order picker, or for dropping beams onto the decking, the testimony indicates that such alleged failures were not the sole proximate cause of his head injuries in light of the fact that the particle board shelving that plaintiff was utilizing as a scaffold collapsed. Where the owner or contractor fails to provide adequate safety devices to protect workers from elevation-related injuries and that failure is a cause of plaintiff’s injury, the negligence, if any, of the injured worker is of no consequence. In other words, even if the plaintiff was partially at fault, a worker’s contributory negligence is not a defense to a Labor Law § 240 (1) claim. Neither comparative fault nor assumption of the risk is a defense to a Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action. Thus, defendant International is not entitled to summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s Labor Law § 240 (1) claim against it, however plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability under Labor Law § 240 (1) as against defendant International.

With regard to the claim for common-law indemnification, defendants American and Levitz move for summary judgment in their favor on their cross claims for common-law indemnification as against International and Heatley. In addition, Heatley moves for summary judgment dismissing International’s third-party action for indemnification on the ground that, under Massachusetts Workers’ Compensation Law § 23, all third-party actions against the employer in common law are barred.

The Court in resolving the claim of the defendants said that, to establish a claim for common-law indemnification, the one seeking indemnity must prove not only that it was not guilty of any negligence beyond the statutory liability but must also prove that the proposed indemnitor was guilty of some negligence that contributed to the causation of the accident. In the absence of any negligence, a claim for common-law indemnity may be established upon a showing that the proposed indemnitor had the authority to direct, supervise, and control the work giving rise to the injury.

Here, defendants American and Levitz have not been shown to be guilty of any negligence. In addition, although vicariously liable for plaintiff’s brain injuries under Labor Law § 240 (1), such liability is not tantamount to negligence. Moreover, defendant International did not exercise a degree of control over plaintiffs work so as to predicate liability based on common-law negligence. In fact, a review of the record indicates that plaintiff’s work was supervised solely by his employer, Heatley.

The Court held that, general supervisory authority is insufficient to constitute supervisory control; it must be demonstrated that the contractor controlled the manner in which the plaintiff performed his or her work, i.e., how the injury-producing work was performed.
Thus, defendants American and Levitz are not entitled to summary judgment in their favor on their cross claim for common-law indemnification as against defendant and third-party plaintiff International. In addition, International is entitled to summary judgment dismissing American and Levitz’s cross claim for indemnification against it.

Moving forward to plaintiff’s cross-motion for lesser burden of proof, the Court said that, a plaintiff who suffers amnesia as a result of a defendant’s acts is not held to as high a degree of proof in establishing his right to recover for head injury as a plaintiff who can describe the events. “It is only where the memory loss has effectively prevented a plaintiff from describing the occurrence that invocation of the rule of Schechter v. Klanfer is warranted”.
In the case of Schechter v. Klanfer (supra), wherein the plaintiff, who was injured while operating a motorboat, was unable to recall the events of his accident, the Court noted:
The danger is, of course, that amnesia is easily feigned. The dangers may be ameliorated. Plaintiff has the burden of proof on the issue of amnesia as on other issues. A jury should be instructed that before the lesser burden of persuasion is applied, because of the danger of shamming, they must be satisfied that the evidence of amnesia is clear and convincing, supported by the objective nature and extent of any other physical injuries sustained, and that the amnesia was clearly a result of the accident.

In the absence of expert evidence establishing a loss of memory and its causal relationship to defendant’s fault, the jury may not consider the question or apply a lesser degree of proof in evaluating plaintiff’s claim. On this record, it is clear that plaintiff, although he suffers from a memory defect caused by his accident, is not entitled to application of this rule. When plaintiff was asked if, other than taking medication, there was any reason that he was not able to testify in his deposition, plaintiff replied in the negative. Thus, as in this case, where the parties are on equal footing insofar as accessibility to the facts there is no need to afford preferential treatment.

The Court in resolving plaintiff’s cross-motion for trial preference, stated CPLR 3403 (a) (3) allows for a trial preference in an action in which the interests of justice will be served by an early trial. Under the circumstances of this case, and in light of evidence of plaintiff’s indigency, plaintiff’s application for a trial preference is granted in the interests of justice. Plaintiff testified that he currently resides in a homeless shelter in Chicago, which provides food to him. Plaintiff, who has not worked since his accident, also testified that he does not know if he can care for himself. Plaintiff also stated that he receives no workers’ compensation and does not have a bank account.

In addition, in his medical report, Dr. Schuster concurs that, as a result of plaintiff’s brain injury, plaintiff is indigent and existing in a city shelter. Kim Allen, the manager of the facility where plaintiff currently resides, stated that at the time that plaintiff was referred to the facility, plaintiff had been wandering the streets in Chicago for several days. She also maintained that, other than cashing his Social Security Disability checks, plaintiff does not manage his own finances. Thus, plaintiff is entitled to trial preference in this action.
Hence, in view of the foregoing, the Court ordered that the part of American’s motion, for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s complaint against it is granted; and the complaint is severed and dismissed as to this defendant.; and it is further ordered that defendant Levitz motion, for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s complaint against it is denied as moot; and it is further ordered defendant and third-party plaintiff International’s motion, for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s Labor Law §§ 240 (1) and 241 (6) claims predicated on violations of Industrial Code 12 NYCRR §§ 23-1.11 (a), 23-1.22 (c) (1) and 23-5.1 (c) (1), (f) and (g) as against it are denied; and it is further ordered that the parts of International’s motion, pursuant to CPLR 3212, for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s common-law negligence and Labor Law § 200 claims, as well as American and Levitz’s cross claims for indemnification as against it, are granted; and it is further the parts of plaintiff’s cross motion, for summary judgment in his favor on his Labor Law § 240 (1) claim as against defendants American and Levitz and directing that plaintiff be entitled to a lower burden of proof due to his cognitive injuries are denied; and it is further ordered that plaintiff’s cross motion, for summary judgment in his favor on his Labor Law § 240 (1) claim as against International, and granting a Special Trial Preference in his favor are granted.
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The state of West Virginia is seeking a federal Medicaid waiver so it can offer a program that will help people with traumatic brain injuries (TBI) remain in their homes, rather than forcing them into nursing homes or other facilities.

Earlier last month, the West Virginia state Supreme Court upheld a County Circuit Court ruling that issued a requirement that the Department of Health and Human Resources had to seek the waiver from the federal entity and that they had to get funding for the program.

A DHHR spokesman told a Lawyer that the program will begin when the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services approves the waiver. Though the agency can’t pinpoint when the waiver will be approved, they did say it plans to provide services to 75 people in the first year, 100 in the second year, and 125 at the third year of the program.

The estimated program costs will be $2 million a year. The State Legislature has already appropriated $800,000 for necessary services such as physical therapy and home health visits.

Back in 2009, a judge ordered the DHHR to seek the waiver and secure funding, but the state appealed, stating that the circuit court had overstepped its bounds. The State Supreme Court called that claim “devoid of merit” and recently rejected the DHHR’s appeal.

The spokesman said Thursday that the waiver application was submitted while state officials awaited the appeal ruling. This speeds up the process since the waiting part has already begun.

Advocates of the program in Staten Island and Suffolk have long complained that West Virginia fails to offer adequate brain injury care. Such inadequate care can cause depression, personality changes, and loss of coordination and memory.

A man whose 39-year-old son suffered a brain injury as a child at the hands of a drunk driver gives others a glimpse into the life of TBI patient. “They can’t plan a meal, they can’t balance a checkbook, and they can’t go to the store on their own.”

Once the waiting is over, this program can help many residents of the state receive the care they probably would not have gotten otherwise.
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A man worked for a Greek restaurant as a dishwasher and as a deliveryman for food ordered for delivery. The Greek restaurant in Staten Island gave the deliveryman a bicycle to use for delivering its food products. On August 5, 2006, the deliveryman was en route to making the last of the fifteen deliveries he had to make during his shift. He was on Pershing Street and was turning left on Manton Street in Briarwood, New York when a car struck him.

The Queens deliveryman was knocked off his bike and he hit his head. He was not wearing a helmet. He his skull and suffered bruising in his brain. His brainwas swollen and so he filed a complaint in damages against the lady driver and owner of the car that struck him on the road. The deliveryman based his claim on the negligence of the lady driver on the road.

The lady driver and owner of the car also filed a complaint against the Greek restaurant, the employer of the bike deliveryman. The lady driver wants the Greek restaurant to indemnify her or at least contribute to the payment of damages claimed by the deliveryman.

The lady driver claims that the Greek restaurant was also negligent. It allowed the deliveryman to ride a bike without giving him training or instructions as to how to ride a bike safely. She claims that the Greek restaurant also failed to provide the deliveryman with a helmet to use when he rode the bike to make his deliveries. She claims that wearing a helmet is required by law and the deliveryman’s failure to wear a helmet contributed to the extent of his injuries.

She also claimed that the Greek restaurant scheduled too many deliveries so that the deliveryman was pressured to ride his bike recklessly on the streets. The lady driver also claimed that the Greek restaurant failed to supervise the deliveryman in the course of his employment.

The Greek restaurant, for its part, filed a motion for summary judgment. It claims that under the Workman’s Compensation Law, the employer can only be made liable to indemnify the lady driver for the claims made by the injured deliveryman if the lady driver succeeds in presenting proof that the deliveryman sustained grave injury. The Greek restaurant claims that it can only be made liable only if the deliveryman sustained a brain injury that resulted in a permanent and total disability.

The lady driver opposed the motion for summary judgment filed by the Greek restaurant but the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. The lady driver appealed the order of the trial court.

The only question before the Court is whether or not the trial court committed an error when it granted the motion for summary judgment of the Greek restaurant.

The Court found that the Workmen’s Compensation Law has a specific and exhaustive list of injuries that it considers grave injuries. One of these enumerated injuries is a brain injury that results in permanent and total disability. The Court held that the term ‘permanent and total disability’ means that the employee can no longer be employed in any capacity as a result of the brain injury he sustained.

The Court found that since the deliveryman has presented medical evidence that details the swelling and clotting and paralysis of some parts of his brain which resulted directly from the fall and fracture he sustained while making his deliveries.

The extent of the brain injury he sustained has raised an issue of material fact which must be tried before a jury. The issue of material fact is whether or not the brain injury resulted in a permanent and total disability.

The Court reversed the order of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Are you like the lady driver in this case who is being made to pay damages for injuries.
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Blast TBI (traumatic brain injury) happens to many combatants, according to doctors. It can rightfully be considered a new class of TBI. While it might share a lot of features with standard TBI, it has some unique aspects that are all its own.

The milder forms of TBI can be very similar to PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder), but it also has distinct aspects of its own. The military currently uses civilian standards of care for TBI when it comes to bTBI (explosive blast TBI), but they are constantly revising their standards to better provide for those injured on the field, according to sources. The theater of war requires different standards of medical practice.

It is apparent that there need to be more studies done on the precise effects of bTBI, both scientifically and clinically. The research will have to be focused upon how explosive blasts can lead to TBI. It is also important to learn how prevalent this disease is, and the exact causes. Once the research reaches a certain level, it will become much easier to diagnose and treat bTBI. A clinical definition of bTBI should quickly create the means to treat bTBI, doctors in Queens and Staten Island believe.

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A community is in an uproar over plans to turn a derelict “eyesore” – property that used to be a filling station – into a specialized brain injury care unit. Residents of Staten island feel the new building will dominate their neighborhood as it would be the only two-story building in the community of bungalows.

A woman living next to the discarded lot spoke out at the meeting. “The site has been an eyesore too long and I don’t object to the idea of the brain injury clinic, but the size of the building would have to be in proportion with the bungalows on either side.”

Because of testimonies like this from the 25 community members who attended the meeting, the planning applications committee unanimously objected to the plans.

Privacy was another issue. The same woman who would live next to the proposed brain clinic already lives across from a nursing home. She fears with the constant egress of new people to two locations would ruin her family’s privacy.

“The plans are just beyond a joke at the moment and I would ask the council to reject them and ask the company to come back with a more suitable plan, like the one accepted in 2005.”
A New York Brain Injury Lawyer looked into the submitted plans and found that planning permission was previously granted for 17 flats; the plans established that the buildings would be about 7m in height. That approval expired in 2009.

The Westchester Lawyer found that the new application is for a building closer to 10m in height at its two-story front. The primary build would be of a square shaped one-story building – with space for gardens in the middle – that would contain 15 bedrooms. This building would be behind a taller front building, which would contain three upstairs treatment rooms and an elevator.

A Taverham county councilor and district councilor for Taverham South backed the objections to the plans but wants to make sure that he definitely supports the building of the brain injury care home. He said: “My clear view on this is that I certainly support the development because the site has been an eyesore and a mess for too long. I also support the principle of the site potentially being used as a brain injury unit, but I don’t support the current design and layout of the plans, they are not suitable.
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Staff members in the employ of Rep. Gabrielle Giffords (D-Ariz.) have become key advocates in the campaign to ensure health-care guarantees for Americans who suffer traumatic brain injuries (TBI). They are advocating that other citizens should be entitled to the same high quality care that the congresswoman is receiving in her recovery from a January shooting.
Last month, Giffords’ chief of staff released a letter urging Health and Human Services to prioritize defining the minimum package of “essential benefits” in the new health-care law that will be required of insurance plans for individuals and small businesses. This new law is expected to be operational by 2014.

Giffords’ Staff members are also planning to join encourage the Defense Secretary to expand the range of “cognitive rehabilitative therapies” that Tricare, the military’s insurance program for active-duty and retired service members, covers in cases of brain injury.

The disparity in coverage of brain injury cases is alarming. It is not uncommon for patients with bare-bones insurance coverage to be discharged after only a week or two in the hospital. As a result, significant medical complications will probably arise. Muscles might begin to contract, or seizures may occur.

Even Americans in Staten Island with more substantial insurance often get shortchanged, which reduces their likelihood of returning to work or even making a complete recovery.

An interested based in New York shares what he recently learned from the president of the Brain Injury Association of America. He says “a person with a moderate to severe injury would likely need at least a month of continuous therapy at a rehabilitative hospital. Exercises would focus on restoring muscular and other physical functions, speech, psycho-social capacity and cognitive functions, such as forming memory and maintaining attention. Next, a patient might spend six to eight weeks at a transitional rehabilitation unit, regaining life skills such as bathing and cooking. Finally, once home he might need rehabilitative therapy three times a week for at least another month.

Such comprehensive rehabilitative care is expensive – at least $8,000 per day for hospital-based “acute rehabilitation,” up to $2,500 for “post-acute residential care” and as much as $1,000 per day for other treatment programs. But still these costs are still a bargain when comparing them to the cost of long-term care for someone who doesn’t receive proper care and ends up permanently disabled.
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Physically, the only real difference between the head being still or in motion when struck, is frame of reference. The real difference, doctors have learned, is that does not lie in if the head is in motion or not, but in such factors as the velocity of impact and the characteristics of the object that strike the head.

So, a high-speed crash will have a greater impact velocity than a low-speed crash – in most cases. In reality, researchers have learned, such details as the type of crash can be very significant. A high speed rollover can be relatively harmless, compared to collision with another vehicle or a fixed object, even if the speed is much lower. Even in crashes that seem very similar, it isn’t uncommon for one person to receive a major head injury, where another did not receive an impact to the head at all.

A major factor in head injury is the striking object itself. Given that the object does not pierce the skull as a bullet would, the important characteristics of the struck or striking object is how stiff it is and its general surface area. Doctors in Staten Island and Suffolk County.

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Injuries caused by an improvised explosive device (IED) can be complicated, doctors have learned. Such a blast can cause a number of injuries that have their own problems, like traumatically amputated limbs, multiple penetrating wounds, and heavy bleeding. It takes a great deal of skill and knowledge to treat injuries from an explosive blast, because there are so many different brain injuriescaused by it.

A number of subspecialists in Queens and Staten Island are required to help the patient, under the direction of a trauma surgeon. Soft-tissue loss is common, in addition to severe burns to the face and scalp. When it comes to the military, a helmet can be excellent protection against penetrating objects, so if the blast does cause penetrating object injuries, it is often through the face, orbit of the eye, or base of the skull, all areas not covered by the helmet. Even when the helmet does prevent an object from penetrating the skull there can still be associated cTBI (closed head traumatic blast injury) that may cause anything from mild concussions to severe contusions and skull fractures, where the helmet is dented from the blow, studies have discovered.

The force of a flying object and where it penetrates are of utmost importance, doctors have told Lawyers. Something traveling at a low speed might penetrate the skull, but actually cause little damage, while something traveling a greater speed could very well cause a secondary cavity in a vital area.

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